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Abstract
East Asian cognition has been held to be relatively “holistic”, that is, attention is paid to 
the field as a whole. Western cognition, in contrast, has been held to be object-focused
and control-oriented. We compared East Asians (mostly Chinese) and Americans on 
detection of covariation and field dependence. The results showed that (1) Chinese
participants reported stronger association between events, were more responsive to 
differences in covariation, and were more confident about their covariation judgments;
(2) These cultural differences disappeared when participants believed they had some
control over the covariation judgment task; (3) American participants made fewer
mistakes on the Rod-and-Frame test, indicating that they were less field dependent; (4) 
American performance and confidence, but not that of Asians, increased when
participants were given manual control of the test. Possible origins of the perceptual
differences are discussed.
Characters (with spaces): 958 
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Scholars in many disciplines have maintained that people in Asian cultures,
especially the East Asian cultures of China, Korea and Japan, have a relatively holistic
cognitive orientation, emphasizing relationships and connectedness. The traditional
Chinese view, from ancient times forward, is that “the world is a collection of
overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs or substances…” (Hansen, 1983, p. 30). Since the 
Chinese saw the world as interpenetrating and continuous, their attempts to understand it 
caused them to be oriented toward the complexities of the perceptual or conceptual field
taken as a whole (Moore, 1968, p. 3). For the Chinese, the individual object was “not a 
primary conceptual starting point” (Moser, 1996, p. 169) “[T]he background scheme [of
Chinese thought was] that of mass substances rather than that of objects and properties” 
(Hansen, 1983, p. 31).
The Chinese stance contrasts with the analytic Western world view, again tracing
far back in time to the ancient Greeks, who saw the world as composed of “objects which
are understood as individuals or particulars which instantiate or ‘have’ properties…”
(Hansen, 1983, p. 30). Whereas the Chinese focused on relationships among objects in 
the field, the Greeks were prone to focus more exclusively on the object, searching for
those attributes of the object that would help to explain and control its behavior ( Moser, 
1996, p. 116; Nakamura, 1964/1985, p. 185-186).
The profound differences in ontology or folk science had many consequences. A 
concern with the attributes of the object was helpful in allowing the Greeks to discover
many important scientific laws (Nakamura, 1964/1985). But the neglect of the field led to 
the failure of the Greeks to understand the fundamental nature of causality in the physical
domain. Aristotle explained a stone’s falling through the air by reference to the stone
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having the property of “gravity” and explained a piece of wood’s floating on the surface
of water as being due to the wood having the property of “levity.” The Chinese, in 
contrast, understood that causation is always the result of interaction between the object 
and the field and recognized the principle of “action at a distance” 2,000 years before
Galileo. The Chinese understood acoustic resonance and magnetism, and knew the 
correct explanation for the behavior of the tides (Needham, 1962). 
Following the views of scholars in several fields (e.g., Abel & Hsu, 1949; Chiu,
1972; Cromer, 1993; Hsu, 1981; Liu, 1974; Nakamura, 1964/1985), Nisbett and Peng and 
their colleagues (Nisbett, 1998; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 1999; Peng &
Nisbett, 1999) have proposed that the holistic cognition characteristic of ancient Chinese 
has its counterpart in the reasoning and perception of contemporary peoples influenced 
by ancient China, including Koreans and Japanese. Similarly, the more analytic cognition
of the ancient Greeks, with its attempts to isolate the object from the field and categorize
it with respect to its properties, has its counterpart in the reasoning and perception of 
contemporary Western peoples. Several recent findings in cultural psychology are
consistent with the proposed differences.
Causal Perception: Attention to the Field or to the Object
One of the best demonstrated phenomena in social psychology is the so-called
“correspondence bias” (Jones, 1979) or “fundamental attribution error” (Ross, 1977). 
People tend to attribute behavior to the object rather than to the field, even when it is
obvious (to the psychologist at least) that the behavior is produced, or at least heavily
influenced by some contextual or situational factor. But Asians have been shown
repeatedly to be more likely than Americans to explain behavior in terms of situational or
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contextual factors, including social roles and obligations (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Hong,
Chiu, & Kung, 1996; Kitayama & Masuda, 1997; Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996; Miller, 
1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Peng & Nisbett, in press).
Part of the reason for the cultural differences probably lies in causal theories.
When people are asked to indicate whether they think human behavior is normally trait-
caused, normally situation-caused, or normally the result of some combination of the 
person and the situation, East Asians endorse the two alternatives ascribing weight to the 
situation more than do Americans (Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999). This is what we 
would expect of people with holistic thinking.
If East Asians endorse holistic theories of behavior, then we might also expect
them to be more likely to attend to events in the environment in the first place. Thus they
might be more capable than Americans of detecting relationships in the environment. 
Since people tend to be confident about things that they are good at, East Asians might
therefore be more confident about relationship detection. In the research reported here,
we examined covariation detection by showing participants one of two arbitrary stimuli 
on the left of a computer screen and one of two other arbitrary stimuli on the right of the
screen. The anticipation was that East Asians would be more capable of accurate
covariation detection than Americans, would be more confident about their covariation 
judgments, and would be less likely to rely on a dubious heuristic for inferring
covariation, namely the primacy effect in which early-seen pairings have a 
disproportionate effect on ultimate covariation judgments (Yates & Curley, 1996).
On the other hand, if Americans have an analytic cognitive style, being inclined to 
separate the object from its environment, then they might be expected to be less “field 
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dependent” (Witkin et al., 1954) than East Asians. Relatively field dependent people are 
more likely to be influenced by frames of reference provided by physical or social 
surroundings than are relatively field independent people.
In order to test whether East Asians are more field dependent than Americans, we 
presented participants with the Rod and Frame Test developed by Witkin and his 
colleagues. The anticipation was that Americans would be less influenced by the position 
of the frame and hence would make fewer errors on the test and would be more confident 
about their performance.
Perception of Control 
Perceived personal control might be expected to affect the performance of 
Americans and East Asians in perceptual tasks in different ways. Since the actor is seen 
as the main cause of behavior in the West, it would seem to follow that a sense of 
personal control is more important in the West than in the East. As Hsu (1981, p. 13) put 
it, “the Chinese tends to mobilize his thought and action for the purpose of conforming to 
the reality, while the American tends to do so for the purpose of making the reality
conform to him”. Control is so important to Westerners that they often fail to distinguish
between objectively controllable and uncontrollable events, tend to perceive more control 
than they actually have, and report mistakenly high levels of predictability of events (see
Presson & Benassi, 1996 for review). This tendency toward an “illusion of control” was 
defined by Langer (1975, p. 313) as expectancy of personal success higher than the 
objective probability would warrant. The illusion of personal control seems to affect
many cognitive functions of Americans. For example, performance on routine tasks is 
improved when people believe they can control the occurrence of a loud noise, even 
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though they do not actually exercise any control over the noise (Glass & Singer, 1973).
Cross-cultural research suggests that a sense of perceived personal control is not 
as important for East Asians as for Americans. Perceived control over external events, or 
“primary control” as defined by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), is stronger for 
European Americans than for East Asian and Hispanic Americans or for Asians (Weisz,
Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984; Morling & Fiske, 1998; Sastry & Ross, 1998). 
“Secondary control” (Weisz, et al, 1984) or accommodation to existing reality including
group needs, is more characteristic of the latter groups. Though the perceived sense of 
controlling external events has been shown to be positively related to adaptation and
mental health for Americans (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Langer, 1983), this may not be the 
case for East Asians (Kitayama, Palm, Masuda & Carroll, 1998; Sastry & Ross, 1998). In
a study by Sethi and Lepper (1998), American children showed high levels of motivation 
to solve anagrams when they had been given free choice regarding which type to solve. 
In contrast, Chinese and Japanese children performed best on anagrams their mothers 
chose for them. Research conducted by Yamagushi, Gelfand, Mizuno and Zemba (1997) 
showed that American males were more optimistic in a condition in which they had an 
illusion of personal control over outcomes, whereas Japanese, as well as American
females, were more optimistic in a group condition in which they had an illusion of 
collective control of the environment.
The evidence thus implies that Americans and East Asians respond differently to 
being given control. That is, Americans, perhaps especially American males, can be 
expected to improve their task performance when given personal control, even if the 
control is illusory. A similar effect of control would not be expected for East Asians.
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Hypotheses
The above considerations lead to several expectations. (1) East Asians should be 
better at detecting covariation in the environment than Americans, and be more confident
about their covariation judgments. (2) On the other hand, East Asians should be more 
field dependent than Americans, that is, they should make more errors on the Rod-and-
Frame test. (3) Americans and East Asians should respond differently to being given
control over perceptual tasks. Americans should benefit more from believing that they
have control, even when the control is illusory. We expected that when given the illusion 
of control over the covariation task, Americans would be better calibrated with respect to 
actual covariation and more confident about their covariation judgments. Similarly, a 
control manipulation should lead Americans to have even better performance on the Rod-
and-Frame test and to have more confidence about their performance. All of these effects
of control should be weaker or nonexistent for East Asians. 
Study 1a: Covariation Detection
Method
Participants
Fifty-four Caucasian American undergraduate students (27 males and 27 females)
and 41 Taiwanese Chinese undergraduate students (19 males and 22 females) at the 
University of Michigan participated in Study 1a. American participants came from the
Psychology Department subject pool and received course credit for their participation.
All Chinese students had graduated from high schools in Taiwan and were recruited from
the Taiwanese Chinese Student Association. They were paid $10 for participating in the 
study.
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Materials
Twelve figures were adapted from the Macintosh II Clip Art Program. All the
figures were common in both cultures and included such objects as a light bulb, a medal, 
a pointing finger, and a coin. All the figures were schematic to ensure that there was little
culture-specific symbolic meaning. On a bifurcated computer screen pairs of figures were
shown to participants. On the left side of the screen was shown one of the two arbitrary
figures – for example, a schematic medal or a schematic light bulb. Immediately
following that, on the right of the screen, one of another two figures – for example, either 
a pointing finger or a schematic coin – was displayed. At each level of covariation, there 
were in total four figures, two of which appeared only on the left of the screen and two of 
which appeared only on the right of the screen.
The actual covariation between figures on the left and on the right was set at one 
of three levels: One level was a zero degree of association, meaning that the probability
of the figures appearing on the right was not related to which figure appeared on the left. 
The other two levels of association corresponded to Pearson correlation coefficients of 
about .40 and .60, representing a moderate covariation and a relatively strong covariation
respectively (see note 1).
The PsyScope program (version 1.0) was used to present the stimuli and to record 
participants’ responses.
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory individually. They sat in front of a Macintosh
II computer and watched the presentation of the figures on the screen. After ten pairings
at each level of covariation, a figure appeared on the left of the screen and a question 
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mark appeared on the right. The participants were first asked to predict “What will appear
on the right”, then asked “How strong is the association between what appears on the left
and what appears on the right”. Their judgments were marked on a scale from 0 (no 
association at all) to 100 (perfect association). Finally they were asked to indicate “How
confident are you about your judgment” along a scale ranging from 50% (no idea) to 
100% (extremely confident). All the scales were printed on an answer sheet, and the 
participants could choose either an English version or a Chinese version of the sheet. 
Results
The anticipations were that Chinese participants, as compared to Americans,
would 1) show better calibration of covariation judgments with actual covariation, 2) be 
more confident about their covariation judgments, and 3) show better calibration of 
confidence judgments with actual covariation. Previous research has found that
Americans show large primacy effects in covariation-detection tasks, judging the nature
of the association to be the same as that seen on the very first few trials (Shaklee &
Mims, 1982; Yates & Curley, 1986). We anticipated that, because of their greater
sensitivity to covariation, 4) Chinese participants would show less primacy bias in their
predictions about which stimulus would be observed on the right side of the screen in the 
final pairing.
Covariation Judgments
Participants’ estimated covariations were submitted to a 2 (culture) X 3 (level of
covariation) ANOVA (see note 2). It may be seen in Figure 1 that there was a strong
main effect of Level of Covariation, indicating that participants’ estimated covariations 
followed the actual covariation changes, F (2, 92) = 15.79, p < .001 (see note 3). There
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was also a main effect of Culture, F (1, 93) = 5.82, p < .02, such that Chinese participants 
estimated higher degrees of covariation than Americans did. Though not anticipated, it is 
not surprising that Chinese would perceive more covariation overall than Americans.
Though Chinese tended to be better calibrated in their covariation judgments, seeing
relatively stronger associations than Americans as covariation increased, the interaction
between Culture and Level of Covariation was not significant, F < 1. 
Confidence judgments
Participants’ confidence judgments were also submitted to a 2 (Culture) X 3
(Level of Covariation) ANOVA. It may be seen in Figure 2 that there were a strong main
effect of Level of Covariation, F (2, 92) = 17.39, p < .001, and a significant main effect
of Culture such that Chinese participants were more confident in their judgments than 
were Americans, F (1, 93) = 14.15, p < .001. Simple effect tests on the between-subject
variable (Culture) revealed higher confidence for Chinese than for Americans at all three
levels of covariation (see note 4). These results thus support our predictions that Chinese 
would be more confident in their covariation judgments than Americans. 
There was an interaction of Culture with Level of Covariation, F (2, 92) = 2.84, p
= .06, indicating that Chinese increased their confidence judgments with actual
covariation increase more than did Americans. Specified contrast analyses of interaction
were conducted. The cultural difference at the .60 covariation level was significantly
greater than at the zero level, t (94) = 2.17, p < .05. The contrasts between .60 and .40 
and between .40 and zero were not significant. The confidence of Chinese participants
was more affected by the extremes of the covariation levels than that of American
participants and therefore Chinese confidence judgments were more closely calibrated
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with actual covariation than those of Americans.
Prediction Accuracy
The final measure of attentiveness to covariation was the degree to which
participants based their predictions about which object would appear on the final trial on 
the degree of covariation actually presented or on some other heuristic. In order to see to 
what extent participants relied on covariation or on a "first-pair-seen" heuristic to make
predictions, we designed two conditions at the .60 covariation level – the level at which 
information should be most reliably detected. One was the Consistent Condition, in 
which the first pairing information was consistent with the covariation information, such 
that a “coin” was first paired with a “dart-board” and the two also appeared together more
frequently during the presentations. The other was the Inconsistent Condition, in which 
the first pairing information and the covariation information were inconsistent and thus 
might lead to different predictions.
We anticipated that Americans might rely more on the “first-pair-seen” heuristic
and Chinese would rely more on the covariation information in their predictions. It may
be seen in Table 1 that in the Consistent Condition, where covariation information and
first-pair-seen information led to the same prediction, an almost equal number of 
Americans (67%) and Chinese (66%) made the correct prediction given the covariation
information. However, in the Inconsistent Condition, many more Chinese made the 
correct prediction based on the covariation information than Americans: 73% versus 
35%. (2 (1, N=94) = 14.10, p < .001). Thus American responses were based on the first 
pairing information rather than on the covariation information presented. 
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Discussion
Chinese participants saw more covariation at all three levels of covariation. In
addition, Chinese participants were more confident about their covariation judgments
than were Americans, albeit rather overconfident. For instance, at the zero covariation
level, confidence judgments might be expected to be 50%, but both the Chinese and 
Americans reported higher confidence (69% for Chinese and 63% for Americans and the 
former was significantly higher than the latter). Such a cultural difference in
overconfidence is consistent with the results of other cross-cultural studies on confidence
judgments (e.g., Wright et al,1978; Yates, Lee & Bush, 1997).
The Chinese confidence judgments also corresponded more to the actual
covariation differences than did the Americans’, as indicated by the fact that differential
confidence was particularly marked at the highest level of covariation. Even more 
indicative of covariation sensitivity, Chinese were more likely to use covariation
information in their predictions about particular pairings whereas Americans were more
likely to rely on a primacy heuristic.
Study 1b: Covariation Detection and Control 
In Study 1b, we attempted to manipulate participants’ sense of control during the 
covariation detection task used in Study 1a. We anticipated that the introduction of 
control might increase Americans’ attention to the stimuli they were “controlling” and
hence the degree of covariation they saw and their confidence in it.
Method
Participants
The participants from Study 1a participated in Study 1b. There was a 15 minute
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break between Study 1a and Study 1b.
Materials
We used two numbers and four pictures of people from the Clip Art Program on a 
Macintosh II computer as event stimuli. Numbers – 1 and 3 – were the figures presented
on the left of the screen. On the right of the screen, one of two arbitrary figures appeared
in random sequence. All stimuli were presented on a Macintosh II computer screen by the 
PsyScope Program (Version 1.0). 
Procedure
Study 1b had a 2 (Culture) X 2 (Operation Mode) factorial design. The Operation
Mode (Control vs. Non-Control) was a within-subject factor. The covariation between
numbers and pictures was randomly determined by the computer, and the number of trials 
was determined by the participants. The average degree of covariation was pre-set to be
zero, but the actual degree of covariation was idiosyncratic for each participant and was
in general greater than zero, probably because participants were more likely to experience
some consistency during an accidental period of association and tended to stop when they
did experience such consistency.
In the Non-Control mode, either the number 1 or the number 3 appeared on the 
left of the screen first. Immediately following, one of two arbitrary stimuli appeared on 
the right of the screen. Both the number and the picture stayed on the screen for a 
duration of 10 seconds before the next pairing started. In the Control Mode, the number 1 
or 3 appeared on the left according to the participants’ action. The participants could 
press either key in any order and a given pairing remained on the screen until participants
pressed a key again. However, the picture that appeared on the right was randomly
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controlled by the computer. Therefore, the nature of the relationships in these two 
conditions – Control and Non-Control – was exactly the same: participants had no 
influence over the covariation between the numbers and the pictures.
Before the experiment, all participants were told, “If you figure out the 
association between the numbers and the pictures, please click the mouse to stop the trial
(or tell the experimenter to stop it).” After they decided to stop, participants were asked,
“Which picture is each of the numbers associated with?” Then they were asked, “How 
strong is the association between the numbers and the pictures?” Their judgments were 
made on a scale from 0 (no relationship at all) to 100 (perfect relationship). Finally, they
were asked to indicate their confidence about their judgments along a scale ranging from
50% (no idea) to 100% (extremely confident).
Results
Covariation Judgments
Participants’ judgments of covariation can be seen in Figure 3. These were
submitted to a 2 (Culture) X 2 (Operation Mode) ANOVA, which revealed a main effect
of Culture such that overall Chinese judged the covariation to be higher than the 
Americans did, F (1, 93) = 4.94, p < .05. The main effect of Operation Mode was not 
significant, F < 1 . However, there was a significant Culture by Operation Mode
interaction, F (1, 93) = 3.80, p = .05, indicating that participants from the two cultures 
reacted differently to the difference in Operation Mode. Simple effect tests revealed that
in the Non-Control Mode, Chinese participants estimated significantly higher covariation
than American participants, F (1,93) = 8.88, p <.01. However, in the Control Mode, the 
cultural difference was trivial, F < 1. 
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Confidence Judgments
Participants’ confidence judgments can be seen in Figure 4. A main effect of
Culture was found, F (1,93) = 4.12, p <.05, such that Chinese were more confident in 
their judgments overall. There was no main effect of Operation Mode. However, the 
Culture by Operation Mode interaction was significant, F (1, 93) = 4.20, p < .05. The 
simple effect tests showed that in the Non-Control Mode, Chinese participants were more
confident than Americans (77% for Chinese and 68% for Americans), F (1, 93) = 8.22, p
< .01. But in the Control Mode, the cultural difference disappeared (74% for Chinese and 
73% for Americans), F < 1. Within Culture simple effect tests on the within subject
variable (Operation Mode) were also conducted. For Americans, the difference between
the Control Mode and the Non-Control Mode was marginally significant, F (1, 93) = 
3.02, p = .09; for Chinese, the difference was not significant, F (1, 93) = 1.45, ns . 
Correlation between actual covariation and estimated covariation
We found that participants were sensitive to the degree of covariation they saw.
We calculated the correlation between each participant’s estimated covariation and the
actual observed covariation. Americans were sensitive in both the Non-Control and 
Control Modes ( r = .37, p < .01 and r = .41, p < .01, respectively). However, matters 
were different for Chinese participants. In the Non-Control Mode, the average correlation
between their estimated covariation and the actual observed covariation was r = .47, p < 
.01. But the correlation was much lower in the Control Mode (r = - .18, ns), indicating
that their calibration actually got worse when they had to control the stimuli (see note 5).
Discussion
We found cultural differences in the Non-Control Mode that were similar to those 
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we found in Study 1a. Chinese perceived more covariation and were more confident than 
Americans in their covariation judgments. We also found that, as anticipated, Americans 
and Chinese responded differently to the control manipulation. When Americans believed
that they had control over the process, their estimated covariation and their confidence
tended to increase whereas Chinese judgments trivially decreased. Moreover, the 
calibration of Chinese covariation judgments was actually impaired by the control
manipulation. A possible explanation for this latter finding is that the cognitive load was 
heavier under the Control Mode than under the Non-Control Mode. Participants not only
needed to figure out the covariation but also needed to be revising hypotheses in order to 
decide which key to press. This additional burden might have made the task more
difficult for Chinese, who did not have the off-setting advantage of the experience of 
control that Americans had. 
The Chinese participants, unlike the American participants, were paid, and thus
one might suspect a greater motivation to perform the task on the part of the Chinese.
While this might explain greater accuracy in Study 1a (though payment does not 
normally affect people’s behavior in judgment experiments; see Colin, 1995), it could not 
explain why control has different effects on the judgments of Americans and Chinese.
Study 2: Field Dependence and Control 
In Study 2, we applied a different paradigm to examine attention to the field. Two 
classic tests were used by Witkin and his colleagues to measure field dependence, or 
ability to differentiate an object from the field.  These are the Rod-and-Frame Test (RFT)
and the Embedded Figure Test (EFT). In the EFT, the task is to find a simple figure in a
more complex one. Some researchers (e.g., Bagley, 1995) have pointed out that this task 
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is not unlike seeing the radical in a Chinese pictograph. A small number of studies have 
shown that Chinese and other East Asians do as well as Americans, if not better, on EFT
(e.g., Bagley, 1995; see De Vos (1980) for related findings with Japanese on Kohs Blocks
Test, another field independence test). Since EFT performance may reflect to some
degree experience with Chinese writing, we focused on RFT in our study (see note 6).
We anticipated that East Asians would be more field dependent than Americans on RFT.
Given the findings of previous research on RFT, we expected that females would be more 
field dependent than males. We also examined the effects of control, with the expectation
that Americans would benefit more from having control than would East Asians. 
Method
Participants
Fifty-six European American (27 males and 29 females) and 42 East Asian (19 
males and 23 females) undergraduate students at the University of Michigan were 
recruited from the Psychology Department subject pool. The East Asian participants were 
mainly from China, Korea, and Japan. The average amount of time they had stayed in the 
US was less than 2.5 years. All participants received course credit for their participation.
We matched participants from the two cultures on SAT math scores. There were no 
differences in scores among the four groups, that is, American males and females, and 
Asian males and females. One male Asian subject’s data was excluded from the data 
analysis because he refused to perform the RFT task after the first 2 trials.
Materials
The classic Rod and Frame machine was used. In this test, a frame about 16 in. 
square is rotated independently of a rod that sits inside it. Both the rod (the black line at 
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the end of the box) and the frame (the box) can be turned independently. The task is to 
judge when the rod appears to be vertical, or “straight up and down” (regardless of the 
position of the frame). People are field dependent to the extent that they are influenced
by the position of the frame when making their judgments.
Procedure
The study had a 2 (Culture) X 2 (Gender) X 2 (Control Mode vs. Non-Control 
Mode) design, with the last variable a within-subject factor. Each participant took the 
Rod and Frame test under two modes. In the Non-Control Mode, the experimenter
adjusted the rod and the participant did not have manual control. The participants were to 
tell the experimenter to stop turning the rod when they thought the rod was straight up 
and down. In the Control Mode, the participants adjusted the rod themselves and stopped 
when they felt the rod was straight up and down. The order of Control and Non-Control
Modes was counterbalanced among subjects within each culture (see note 7).
The dependent variables were: 1) the errors participants made in each trial,
defined as the degrees of arc of the final rod position’s deviation from the vertical
position, and 2) confidence judgments provided by participants at the end of testing in 
each mode, when they were asked to estimate their performance on a twelve point scale 
indicating how close their judgments were to a true vertical position. 
Results
The anticipations for the RFT were that: 1) Asians would show more field 
dependence than Americans; 2) Americans would benefit more from being given control
over the task, and that 3) control would make Americans think they were being more 
accurate, and this would be less true for East Asians.
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Field Dependence
A 2 (Culture) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (Control) Repeated Measurement ANOVA was
conducted on the mean errors on RFT for all 16 trials (see note 5). It may be seen in 
Figure 5 that European Americans made fewer mistakes on the RFT than East Asians, F
(1,93) = 4.16, p < .05. Consistent with previous research, males made fewer mistakes 
than females, F (1,93) = 3.84, p = .05. It is important to note that the credibility of both 
the cultural difference and the gender difference is enhanced by the fact that participants
were matched on a related ability, namely mathematics.
We also measured the time participants spent on completing each trial of RFT in 
the Control Mode, in which participants had manual control of the rod and could choose 
how long to spend on each trial. There is no suggestion in these data that East Asians 
were engaging in any kind of speed-accuracy tradeoff. On the contrary, Asian males
actually took longer than American males in addition to making more errors, p = .01. 
Asian females did not differ from American females.
Reactions to Control
The effects of control can be examined by comparing the participants’ errors in
Control vs. Non-Control Modes, and by comparing the confidence judgments in the two 
modes.
Effect of control on errors. The 2 (Culture) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (Control vs. Non-
Control) ANOVA revealed a significant 3-way interaction effect, F (1,93) = 4.40, p < .05 
(see Table 2). We had anticipated that Americans would be less field dependent when 
given control, whereas this would be less true for East Asians. This was the case for
males (interaction F (1,43) = 4.51, p = .04). Indeed East Asian males tended to do worse 
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when given control. Control had no differential effect on performance of American and 
East Asian females (F (1,50) < 1). None of the four simple effect comparisons between 
Control and Non-Control Modes was significant.
Effect of control on confidence. At the end of testing for each mode, we asked
participants to indicate how close they thought their judgments were to true vertical on 
average. The results can be seen in Figure 6, where higher numbers mean participants
thought their performance was closer to the exact vertical position. As anticipated, the 
simple effects tests showed that Americans believed that they had done better with 
control, F (1,95) = 7.39, p < .01. In contrast, East Asians did not feel their performance
had been influenced by having control or not, F (1,95) < 1. Thus, Americans became 
more confident with control, whereas control had no such impact on East Asians’
confidence. The interaction effect of culture and control was marginally significant, F
(1,95) = 2.68, p =.105 (see note 9).
Discussion
Americans’ performance on the Rod and Frame Test indicates that they are less
field dependent than East Asians. They made fewer mistakes and American males spent
less time on the task.  The field independence of Americans is consistent with the notion 
that they are more attentive to the object and its relation to the self than to the field. Asian
participants’ greater field dependence is consistent with the notion that they are more
attentive to the field and to the relationship between the object and the field.
In addition, the study indicates that having control makes more difference for
Americans’ confidence judgments than for that of East Asians. American participants’
confidence was significantly increased when they were given control, and this was not 
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the case for East Asian participants. In addition, American males actually made fewer
errors on the task when given control. The results support the idea that perceived control 
is more important for Americans than for East Asians.
General Discussion
The findings support our view that East Asians are more attentive to relationships
in the environment than Americans. This leads them to see covariation with greater
accuracy and confidence. On the other hand, Americans are more accustomed to analysis
of a focal object in the environment and to orienting the self in relation to the object.
Hence they made fewer errors on the Rod-and-Frame task. In addition, the two groups 
responded very differently to being given control. We believe that these differences are
due to habitual differences in the way Easterners and Westerners attend to their 
environments, rather than to any social, economic, or ability level confounds. In Study 1 
participants from both cultural groups were all undergraduate students at the same 
university. Thus socio-economic and ability differences would not likely have been very
great. Study 2 was intended to speak directly to the sampling issue. Study 2 included 
participants from different East Asian countries, including China, Japan, and Korea. 
Moreover, we matched American participants and East Asian participants on their SAT 
math scores to make the two samples comparable. Perhaps most importantly, we find
compatible results with a number of other variables and with a wide variety of other 
populations. East Asians are more holistic than Westerners on a variety of variables,
whether we look at Chinese, Koreans or Japanese, and whether we look at people
studying in the US or studying in their home countries, and whether we test them in 
English or in their native languages.
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The interpretation of results in terms of attention gains credence from a recent
study by Masuda and Nisbett (1999) requiring  participants to watch underwater scenes in 
which a focal fish moved across a field of less salient fish and animals and static seascape
features such as rocks and coral. When asked to describe what they had seen, Japanese
participants reported more observations about the background and more relationships
between the focal fish and the background than did American participants. The results 
support our contention that East Asians orient themselves to the environment as a whole 
and to relationships among objects within it. 
Social and Economic Origins of the Perceptual Differences?
Following scholars in several disciplines including history, ethnography and
philosophy of science, we believe that the sorts of cognitive and perceptual differences
between East Asians and Europeans that we find are due to social structure differences
(Cromer, 1993; Lloyd, 1990, p. 131; Nakamura, 1964/1985, p. 413; Witkin & Berry,
1975). East Asian societies such as China’s were until quite recently based on agricultural 
economies in which cooperation is crucial and hierarchical political organization requires
obedience. The social environment is highly complex and constraining and attention to it 
is essential for effective action. In contrast, European economies were based on hunting
and herding to a much later period, and, uniquely among the great ancient civilizations,
that of Greece was not based on agriculture but on animal husbandry, fishing, and trade.
Cross-cultural research indicates that hunting and herding peoples, as well as 
people who live in the relative freedom of modern wage economies, emphasize
autonomous functioning in child rearing and have a relatively loose social structure 
(Barry, Child, & Bacon, 1959; Whiting & Child, 1953). In contrast, sedentary agricultural
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groups stress interpersonal orientation and conformity in child-rearing and they have a 
tight social structure, in which group members need to accommodate each other and 
strive to regulate one another’s behavior.
Work by Witkin and his colleagues (e.g., Witkin & Goodenough, 1977) within
U.S. culture gives added credence to the notion that the cognitive differences between
cultures are related to the social differences between cultures. Relatively field dependent 
people are more likely to take account of the frames of reference provided by the social
surroundings in defining such attributes of self as attitudes, sentiments, feelings and self-
view (Rudin & Stagner, 1958) and to be selectively attentive to social cues (Eagle,
Goldberger & Breitman, 1969). Field dependent people have an interpersonal orientation, 
show strong interest in others, and prefer to have people around them and even physically
close to them, whereas field independent people have an impersonal orientation, show 
relatively little interest in others, and prefer more solitary and nonsocial situations 
(Greene, 1973; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977).
Thus the work of Witkin and his colleagues indicates that the differences in
attention to the perceptual field are due to differences in requirements to pay attention to 
the social environment. Berry (1976; Berry & Annis, 1974) has maintained that the 
differences found within societies have a parallel across societies. Farmers, who are
required to attend to the social environment, are more field dependent than either hunters 
or industrialized peoples. The latter are relatively free to focus on their own goals in 
relation to an object rather than having to coordinate their actions in relation to a complex
social world.
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Attention to Social Stimuli
The above account strongly implies that East Asians are more attentive to their
social environments than are Americans. We have some evidence that this is the case. Ji,
Schwarz and Nisbett (in press) found evidence that Chinese college students were more 
knowledgeable about the observable behaviors of their peers than were American
students. Hedden, Park, Ji, Nisbett, Jing & Jiao (1999) presented words to Chinese and 
American participants that were either on social backgrounds (pictures of people),
nonsocial backgrounds, or no background and then asked the participants to recall the 
words. Chinese recall of words was superior when the word had appeared on a social
background whereas this was not true for Americans.
Social Environment and Control
It is plausible that the same social factors that lie behind the cultural differences in
attention to the environment also affect the meaning and importance of control.
Agricultural societies with relatively “tight” social structures require the individual to
accommodate to social requirements. Hunting, herding, and wage economy societies 
encourage the individual to exert control over the environment. Hui and Triandis (1986) 
argue that Western cultures encourage individuals to pursue personal goals and to 
develop personal autonomy (“primary control”), whereas Asian cultures encourage
individuals to accommodate personal needs to the overall goals of the family and to
adhere to social norms (“secondary control”). Thus, it seems to us that East Asian 
sensitivity to the environment and American sensitivity to being given control both 
reflect important differences in cultural realities, and that they are results of adapting to 
quite different social environments.
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The differential sensitivity of East Asians and Americans to relationships in the
environment and to being given control may have implications for many domains. For
instance, in education, teachers may want to emphasize different things when dealing
with Asian students than when dealing with American students since the focus of 
attention of the two groups may be different. Asian students may need more help in 
differentiation and analysis of focal objects, whereas American students may need more 
help in seeing relationships between objects, including the self and the field.
As more and more commercial activity occurs involving different cultures, it may
be helpful to business people to know that East Asians and Americans respond differently
to being given control. East Asians may appreciate control less than Americans would
tend to assume and Americans may resent lack of control more than Asians would guess.
Asian visitors to the U. S. are often stunned when their hosts nonchalantly ask them to 
“help themselves”, and Americans may feel equally uncomfortable when they are
“deprived” of freedom by their hospitable Asian hosts, who believe they are taking good
care of their guests by presenting their guests with what they themselves think is best.
Cultural misunderstandings may sometimes derive from superficial differences in 
customs, but the work presented here suggests that they may sometimes be produced by
rather deep and fundamental differences in orientations toward the world. 
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Notes
1. Previous work with arbitrary stimuli indicates that .60 represents a level of 
covariation that can be reliably detected with arbitrary stimuli (Jennings, Amabile &
Ross, 1980). 
2. When gender was included in the analysis, there was no significant effect of 
gender nor interaction effect involving gender.
3. All p levels are based on two-tailed tests.
4. At the zero level, F (1, 93) = 6.68, p < .02; at the .40 level, F (1, 93) = 4.87, p < 
.05; and at the .60 level, F (1, 93) = 18.59, p < .001.
5. The difference between .47 and -.18 is significant at .01 level.
6. We included the EFT as an exploratory measure, though we had no predictions
about cultural difference. We found no significant cultural difference on this task. 
7. The manipulation of order had no effect.
8. Each participant provided  16 RFT error data points. Data points identified by
boxplots as extremes --more than 3 box lengths (the interquartile range) from the upper or 
lower edge of the box -- were excluded from the analysis. On average, 1.2 data points 
were excluded for each participant.
9. We didn’t anticipate any effect of gender, therefore we didn’t include gender in 
our analysis. However, we did perform an analysis including gender as a factor. When
gender was considered, the simple effect tests still held. Indeed, both American males and
American females believed their performance was improved when given control than not, 
both ps <=.06. Control had no such impact on either Asian males or females, both ps
>.25.
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